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Internationalisation of the State in the Czech Republic: 
Igniting the Competition for Foreign Investment 
in the Visegrád Four Region*
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University of Mannheim
Abstract: This article focuses on a key episode in the Czech political-economic 
history of the 1990s, the abandonment of ‘Czech capitalism’, and the switch 
towards the competition state and an economic model based on foreign in-
vestment. The account of the U-turn in the policy approach to foreign inves-
tors identiﬁ es domestic actors that have had a crucial role in organising politi-
cal support for the competition state. These actors, which the author calls the 
‘comprador’ service sector, have an important role in mediating the structural 
power of transnational investors and translating it into other forms of power 
within the state. These actors also had a major role in shaping the U-turn in 
policy in the Czech Republic.
Keywords: economic policy, state, class, foreign direct investment, Czech Re-
public 
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On 29 April 1998, the Czech Republic rolled out the most generous investment 
scheme yet seen among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This 
ignited a race for greenﬁ eld investors in the Visegrád Four region (V4). The Czech 
policy U-turn was followed by a reinvention of the investment scheme in Hun-
gary and by the introduction of investment schemes in Poland and Slovakia [Gan-
dullia 2004: 15–16; C. Jensen 2006]. The Czech U-turn in its relation to foreign 
investors marked a moment of convergence of state strategies in the region. States 
became increasingly internationalised, forging economic globalisation by facili-
tating capital accumulation for transnational investors. After the attempts to pro-
mote national capitalisms failed in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and – to a lesser 
extent – in Poland, the attraction of foreign direct investment has become a prior-
ity throughout the region [Bohle 2002; Bohle and Greskovits 2006]. While inter-
nally oriented state strategies dominated policy making in the CEE throughout 
the 1990s, by the end of the decade, state economic strategies converged towards 
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different models of the competition state. The V4 developed a speciﬁ c model of 
the competition state, aimed at attracting strategic foreign direct investment (FDI) 
through targeted subsidies [see Drahokoupil 2007]. 
This article focuses on a key episode in Czech political-economic history, 
the abandonment of ‘Czech capitalism’ [Myant 2003], and the switch towards the 
competition state and an FDI-oriented accumulation. The account of the policy 
U-turn identiﬁ es domestic actors that have a crucial role in organising political 
support for the competition state. These actors, which I call the ‘comprador’ serv-
ice sector, have an important role in mediating the structural power of transna-
tional investors and translating it into other forms of power within the state.1 The 
political analysis in this article also deconstructs common misconceptions about 
the political support for the competition state. It shows that the competition state 
has broad social support that goes beyond party divisions, even though it is often 
politicised along party lines.
Why and how did the Czech Republic reconsider its policy towards for-
eign investors? And, what is perhaps more puzzling, why did it introduce an 
approach favourable to foreign investors only in the late 1990s? Existing literature 
on the region offers a number of ways to look at the problem. First, the ‘transitol-
ogy’ literature that dominated the academic mainstream in the aftermath of 1989 
has attributed analytic primacy to internal determination of the post-communist 
transformation. This rationale leads us to investigate the domestic determina-
tion of policy pathways. Respective analyses then focused on domestic actors, 
networks, projects, and constraints [Stark and Bruszt 1998; Dobry 2000; see Bohle 
2000]. Second, the ‘transitology’ literature was later criticised by neo-Gramscian 
scholars who emphasised the centrality of the global context of transition and 
underscored its external determination. This paradigm then identiﬁ ed foreign 
investors and their domestic allies as the major actors in an environment with 
weak domestic social forces, most notably capital and labour [Bohle 2002; Hol-
man 1998, 2004; Shields 2003, 2004; van der Pijl 2001]. Finally, from an economic 
sociology perspective, Bandelj [2007] has pointed out the importance of social 
and cultural ties between host and home countries and the embeddedness of in-
vestors in social structures, cultural understandings, and power relations. 
I argue that the belief in the importance of the international political-eco-
nomic environment for transition strategies, which led initially to false predic-
tions about the prominence of FDI in the post-communist transition, was ulti-
mately not mistaken. The international environment in which transition and 
post-transition policy-making took place indeed had a crucial role in explaining 
ﬁ nal outcomes. But there is a missing link. The pressures of the transnational 
environment had ﬁ rst to be translated, embodied, and expressed by key actors in 
domestic politics and within the state. 
1 As explained in detail below, ‘comprador’ refers to a structural link of the sector with 
transnational capital.
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My analysis below will show that domestic politics plays a crucial role in 
this process. Domestic politics, however, cannot be understood as completely in-
ternally determined. It must be treated as an instantiation of locally materialising 
transnational processes. Domestic politics understood as transnationally consti-
tuted allows comprehension of both the initial inward-oriented outcomes and 
the later shift towards the competition state. Theoretically, this article draws on 
a strategic-relational state theoretical perspective [see Drahokoupil, Van Apel-
doorn and Horn 2008]. Accordingly, the structure and organisation of the econ-
omy, institutions, and ideas have a major role in constituting social forces and 
in mediating their relative power and social inﬂ uence. These structural features 
produce a ‘ﬁ eld of force’ [cf. Kalb 1997] that exerts pressures and sets limits on 
what is achievable. In other words, they constitute a (strategically-selective) envi-
ronment that provides advantages to some actors and strategies over others. Yet, 
actual outcomes are produced by strategic actors in social struggles. In the trans-
nationally constituted domestic politics, some structural opportunities are en-
acted – or some social mechanisms are activated – while other are suppressed or 
muted. Combining political economy and political analysis creates an approach 
that complements and goes beyond Bandelj’s economic sociology perspective. It 
identiﬁ es actors pursuing their interests, which reduces the degree of contingen-
cy in what the economic sociology approach depicts (merely as) culturally and 
socially embedded strategies. It also uncovers the power relations overlooked by 
such an approach by analysing the structural power inscribed in the political and 
economic environment and the processes whereby it was translated into actual 
outcomes. This kind of political analysis complements the alternative approach 
based on regression models. The latter makes it possible to assess the inﬂ uence 
of individual factors in a more formal and systematic way, yet it is susceptible to 
impressionist and at times misleading interpretations of actual political strategies 
(see my review of Bandelj on the pages of this journal, Vol. 44 (6): 1224–1228).
Below I ﬁ rst present my interpretation of the comprador service sector as 
a force that mediates the structural power of transnational capital and organises 
the political support for the competition state. Second, I outline the struggle in 
the early 1990s that gave rise to the ‘Czech way’, despite the fact that the interna-
tional political-economic environment provided advantages to the competing ex-
ternally-oriented project. Finally, I analyse the policy U-turn in which the Czech 
state reconsidered its approach to FDI and introduced targeted investment subsi-
dies. In particular, I identify the strategic role of the comprador service sector in 
this move and also the role of other actors, including the EU and multinational 
investors. Publicly unavailable data were collected through archival research and 
qualitative interviews with key policy makers, politicians, and business elites [see 
Drahokoupil 2008]. 
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The structural power of the multinationals and the strategic role 
of the comprador service sector
The literature on (FDI-)dependent development has emphasised the crucial role 
of domestic actors in the political coalitions that underpinned the projects of de-
velopment relying on FDI in global peripheries. Poulantzas used the term ‘com-
prador bourgeoisie’ to describe the underlying class relations. The comprador 
bourgeoisie was deﬁ ned as ‘that fraction whose interests are entirely subordi-
nated to those of foreign capital, and which functions as a kind of staging-post 
and direct intermediary for the implantation and reproduction of foreign capital’ 
[Poulantzas 1976: 42; cf. Baran 1957]. In CEE, Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley [1998: 
Chapter 5] identiﬁ ed foreign investors with their comprador intellectual allies as 
one of the major candidates for a new propertied class. Holman argued that the 
new power elites in the region cannot be characterised as a propertied compra-
dor bourgeoisie, but rather as managerial and administrative elites that have the 
same function as that of the comprador bourgeoisie [Holman 2004: 223]. Lane 
proposed that a transnational political class, an alliance between internal elites 
and external global political class in particular, was a crucial agent of change in 
CEE in the 1990s, which effectively precluded the development of social demo-
cratic or corporatist forms of national capitalism [Lane 2005, 2006]. From an elite 
perspective, Machonin, Tuček and Nekola [2006] observed that the inﬂ uence of 
domestic elites is limited by an ‘apparent hegemony of foreign capital’. They ar-
gued that the inﬂ uence of local managers working for foreign afﬁ liates is based 
not on wealth, but on a ‘mandate from abroad’. However, the comprador seg-
ments are not sufﬁ ciently speciﬁ ed in these accounts. Holman and Lane offer an 
analytic understanding; yet they do not identify differences between domestic 
elites in their approach to FDI and fail to distinguish between the limited impor-
tance of FDI in the early 1990s and its hegemonic role later in the decade.
I describe the domestic actors linked to FDI as the comprador service sec-
tor, which comprises various groups providing services to foreign investors. It 
includes local branches of global consulting and legal advisory service ﬁ rms and 
their local competitors, companies providing other services to foreign investors, 
and ofﬁ cials from FDI-related state bodies. Structurally, this sector is not a bour-
geoisie, as it constitutes neither a propertied class, nor a professional manage-
rial class whose interests are directly linked to that of company owners. For this 
reason, I prefer to call them a service sector rather than bourgeoisie. Yet, recent 
trends, most notably the emergence of regional developers such as the IPEC 
Group2, indicate processes of embourgeoisement within this sector. Without im-
plying any value judgement, I refer to this group as comprador, as it is deﬁ ned 
by its structural connection/link to transnational capital. From a more agent-ori-
ented perspective, this group could largely be seen as an ‘epistemic community’ 
[Haas 1992] or ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ [DiMaggio 1988]. However, such an 
2 See www.ipec-group.com.
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approach would ignore the importance of the ‘social relations of production’ (like 
in Marx) and of the Weberian ‘market situation’ in constituting this group. In 
particular, it would overlook the importance of the structural connection/link 
to transnational capital and foreign-oriented economic model (or accumula-
tion strategy) in the formation of the interests and strategies of this group. The 
structural link to the structural power of capital provides an important source 
of power for this sector. A ‘market situation’ in which service providers could 
charge foreign investors fees in excess of the local market average represented an 
important pull factor that united and consolidated the comprador service sector. 
Thus, the group was not installed by foreign capital to work on its behalf. Instead, 
it took shape in the process in which domestic actors were seeking linkages with 
foreign investors, as soon as the structure of opportunities created such possibili-
ties. The comprador is thus not an essentialist feature of a group: it is a class posi-
tion created by the changing structure of opportunities and political-economic 
relations that – given the accompanying ‘market situation’ – attracts people with 
the necessary skills (including those who previously supported the national, in-
ward-oriented project).
The structural power of capital derives from the dependency of the state and 
society at large on the investment decisions of those who control key productive 
factors (e.g. the possibility of investment strike and state revenue dependence).3 
Capital mobility has greatly increased the power of transnational investors, as 
they are able to locate their investment outlets in the regulatory environment of 
their choice and have the possibility of exit (at varying relocation costs). In CEE, 
the neo-liberal transition strategies greatly facilitated the structural power of trans-
national investors as they abolished the Comecon4 markets and opened the do-
mestic economies to global competition [Boer-Ashworth 2000]. CEE economies 
specialising within the Comecon in complex sectors [see, e.g., Berend 1996] were 
not able to compete on the world market and had to downgrade and diversify their 
production proﬁ les in order to be able to sell there [see Myant 2003]. Multinational 
enterprises rather than domestic companies controlled the necessary know-how 
and distributional networks and were thus major agents of enterprise revival and 
reintegration of CEE into the world market [Myant and Drahokoupil 2010]. 
But the structural power of capital does not predetermine a single outcome; 
nor does it predetermine a single policy even in economies as highly depend-
ent on FDI as those in the V4. The cumulative empirical evidence contradicts 
the trade-off between redistribution and investment implied in the ‘structural 
dependency’ thesis as formulated by Przeworski and Wallerstein [1988]. First, a 
variety of domestic political-economic strategies can be competitive in the inter-
3 See, inter alia, Hirschman [1970]; Przeworski and Wallerstein [1988]; Offe and Ronge 
[1975]; Gough [1979]. For a detailed discussion of the structural and agency power of capi-
tal, see Gill and Law [1989] and Farnsworth [2004].
4 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was disbanded at the ﬁ nal 
council session on 28 June 1991 in Budapest.
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national economy, including those relying on high spending and taxation [Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Rodrik 1997]. Second, physical and human capital endowments 
can facilitate the pursuit of policies that are against the immediate interests of 
capital even in a very open economy [Shafer 1994; Gerefﬁ  1995]. Third, research 
on the actual locational decisions of multinationals has shown that these tend to 
be determined primarily by proximity and market access and by the skills and 
educational attainment levels of the host economy’s workforce; there is no evi-
dence that the degree of market regulation or non-wage labour costs suppress 
the level of inward investment [Cooke and Noble 1998; Cooke 2001]. Given that 
the structural constraints facilitate a wider variety of policies (at least from the 
perspective of advanced capitalist countries), the discursive constitution of what 
is possible, or what the markets and investors ‘really want’, becomes often more 
important and limiting than the actual ‘hard’ constraints [Watson and Hay 2003]. 
In this context, the political activities of the comprador service sector had a major 
role in actively contributing to the discursive construction of the constraints and 
limits of the political economic environment and the imperatives of capital mobil-
ity in particular.
Capital mobility, however, constrains the autonomy of policy makers in the 
V4 region, as many investors regard the region as a single investment location, 
with EU market proximity, good institutional infrastructure, and a comparable 
workforce and labour costs. This puts structural pressures on policies that are 
deemed important for the investors. It also allows investors to arbitrage locations 
in order to get additional beneﬁ ts in the form of investment subsidies. This can 
make some cost considerations that are generally marginal in location decision 
an important factor. In the context of the early stage of FDI inﬂ ows addressed in 
this article, the avoidance of political risks that increase the costs of internation-
alisation was one of the major concerns for the multinationals. The latter face 
signiﬁ cant disinvestment costs once invested in a foreign market. As a risk man-
agement strategy, investors tend to seek explicit commitments to FDI-friendly 
policies that can be used as a political ‘stick’ against policies that may represent 
an ‘expropriation of [expected] revenue streams’ [N. M. Jensen 2003]. From the 
perspective of many investors and their advisers in the early 1990s (including 
those I interviewed), such commitment was missing from the Czech Republic. 
The introduction of the investment scheme package was a signal to investors that 
the Czech Republic was open for their business.
Functionally, the comprador service sector is a nodal point and organiser 
of the transnational power bloc centred on multinational investors. These com-
prador blocs also include signiﬁ cant fractions of domestic capital, which are 
becoming largely internationalised and/or subordinated to international inves-
tors. The comprador sector constitutes an important link between investors and 
states, which is missing from the state-investor bargaining models that dominate 
the scholarship on FDI and the power of capital in general [e.g. Przeworski and 
Wallerstein 1988; N. M. Jensen 2003; Meyer and Jensen 2005]. Governments are 
Jan Drahokoupil: Internationalisation of the State in the Czech Republic
555
not social actors independent of other social forces, including investors. The actu-
al policy outcomes are products of the agency of particular social forces mediated 
through structures of representation inscribed in the state. In this spirit, Bohle 
and Husz [2005] pointed to the congruence of interests between the investors 
and national elites in the V4. To be more precise, I argue that it is the privileged 
position that social forces connected to FDI gained within respective states that 
explains the support for FDI promotion and the competition state in general. The 
comprador service sector helps to translate the structural power of transnational 
capital into tactical forms of power that enable agential power to work in sync 
with the interests of the multinationals. The notion of tactical power introduces 
an intermediate level between the structural and agential faces of power. Tactical 
power, or what others call agenda-setting power [see Hay 2002: 174–178], refers 
to the ability to control the settings of interaction or the respective ﬁ eld of force 
[Wolf 1990]. It enables the structural power to work in sync with its agential coun-
terpart. 
Power through agency is exercised by direct participation of business with-
in and in relation to the state institutions. The particular channels of representa-
tion that the comprador service sector and foreign investors organised and took 
advantage of are analysed below. As mentioned above, the success of these activi-
ties cannot be attributed to the strategy of the comprador sector alone, but rather 
to its connection/link to the structural power of the investors (power through 
agency). They could thus offer carrots in the form of political capital from job 
creation and imports of the sophisticated technology associated with greenﬁ eld 
investment by multinationals. The (perceived) risk of an investor deciding not to 
invest in the country because of a lack of FDI-friendly policies then represented a 
political ‘stick’ the sector could use. In the Czech context these ‘carrots and sticks’ 
have become particularly effective in times of crisis, when the failure of the alter-
native, internally oriented accumulation strategy becames apparent. 
As noted above, strategic agency can have a crucial role in shaping the un-
derstanding of the international political-economic imperatives. The tactical, or 
agenda-setting, strategies pursued by the comprador service sector often facilitat-
ed the learning process in which policy makers came to understand the impera-
tives of the structural power of multinationals. In the Czech Republic, where the 
internally oriented model and the reluctance to implement FDI-friendly policies 
became particularly entrenched, the comprador service sector became especially 
organised and implemented a number of activities aimed at redeﬁ ning the ap-
proach of policy makers to FDI. It thus taught lessons on the importance of for-
eign investors for the domestic economy and on the need to implement policies 
that would favour them. 
At the same time, however, the strategic role of the comprador service sector 
should not be overestimated. While they had a major role in redeﬁ ning the ap-
proach to FDI in general, their speciﬁ c role in policy design was largely limited to 
deﬁ ning the competition strategy based on attracting investors through targeted 
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subsidies. A comprehensive understanding of the Czech path of adjustment to 
international political-economic pressures, including the transformation of social 
policies and the welfare state, would also have to take into account the strategic 
agency of other forces, including domestic capital and labour and their interplay 
with various path dependencies and structural and institutional endowments 
[see, e.g., Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Drahokoupil 2009]. This analysis focuses 
only on the shift in the approach to FDI in general and on the narrow area of 
industrial policy.
The early 1990s: the ‘Czech way’ against the odds
There were good reasons to expect foreign investment to dominate post-com-
munist economic restructuring in CEE. Strategically, reformers in CEE were well 
integrated into a transnational policy network where openness to FDI was the 
norm. Western politicians and many advisors have seen FDI as a ‘Marshall Plan 
for Eastern Europe’. USAID-ﬁ nanced investment bankers embarked on a mission 
to handle the sale of state-owned enterprises to foreign investors. They had di-
rect access to key decision-makers in Eastern Europe [Meaney 1995]. Structurally, 
the neo-liberal strategy of the region’s integration into global capitalism or the 
‘American approach’ [Gowan 1995, 1996; cf. van der Pijl 2006: 237–242] provided 
strategic advantages to FDI-reliant strategies. This doctrine installed political-
economic structures that made the exigencies of global accumulation a political 
prerequisite for national strategies in the region. The peripheral mode of integra-
tion on which CEE embarked made the region structurally dependent on foreign 
capital [cf. Boer-Ashworth 2000; Bohle 2006]. These structural exigencies repre-
sent the main mechanism that account for the emergence of the competition state 
in CEE. However, they were not translated into political outcomes until the end 
of the 1990s.
In the early 1990s, state strategies were actually open to foreign direct in-
vestment in Hungary only. The approach to FDI in general and privatisation in 
particular has been quite hostile to foreign investors in the rest of the V4. Yet, the 
outcome is puzzling only in the Czech case. Only in the Czech Republic were for-
eign investors interested in high-commitment involvement, while state managers 
controlled enterprises and could have transferred them to foreign investors if they 
wished.5 The structural constraints did not allow for open outcomes elsewhere. 
5 The bulk of enterprises were privatised through privatisation projects submitted by en-
terprise managers and the outcomes were often in line with their interests. However, the 
privatisation method was decided by the reformers, and managers had to anticipate their 
expectations when designing privatisation proposals. There is no evidence that managers 
inﬂ uenced the method of privatisation; on the contrary, research shows that they had very 
little power and agency when the privatisation method was being designed [Orenstein 
2001; Gould 2001; Appel 2004].
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First, unlike Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovakia did not inherit signiﬁ cant debt 
and thus did not have to subordinate privatisation strategy to obtaining cash in 
hard currency as the Hungarians did. Second, unlike in Poland and Slovakia, 
foreign investors were interested in taking over the commanding heights of the 
Czech economy. Finally, unlike in Poland, effective control over enterprise priva-
tisation lay with Czech policy makers rather than with enterprise insiders.
Czech state strategy was shaped in a struggle between two groups within the 
state. The ‘industrialists,’ on the one hand, advocated a privatisation programme 
that would ﬁ nd strategic owners, foreign investors, for main enterprises. Most 
notably, Jan Vrba, then Minister of Industry and Trade, believed that only for-
eign investors could provide access to new technologies, know-how, distribution 
networks, and capital investment. He planned to bring foreign investors to what 
he identiﬁ ed as the core of the Czech economy. The externally oriented strategy 
had wider support within the ministries. It came mainly from the ‘business elite’, 
that is, bureaucrats linked to enterprise managers. On the other hand, neo-liberal 
reformers – who, in contrast to the industrialists, were involved in designing the 
general transition strategy – promoted a hands-off, voucher-based privatisation 
model. The hands-off model was incompatible with FDI entry, which demanded 
an active approach by the state to secure the contractual commitments required 
by investors. What is more, the neo-liberals did not favour the participation of 
foreign investors and preferred the creation of a domestic capitalist class [Kupka 
1992; McDermott 2002; Appel 2004].
Vrba offered the leading Czech companies for sale to foreign investors in 
June 1991. There were a number of foreign investors ready to bid for the com-
manding heights of the Czech economy. In retrospect, Czech reformers and in-
tellectuals close to Klaus explain the relative absence of foreign investors in the 
privatisation of the early 1990s by the lack of interest on the part of foreign inves-
tors.6 The historical record, however, suggests that this was not the case. There 
was considerable interest among foreign investors to buy out Czech state-owned 
enterprises at that time. Vrba and his team managed to put together a list of buy-
ers for what they saw as the commanding heights of the Czech economy. Vrba’s 
team managed to conclude a number of deals with foreign investors, most no-
tably the transfer of Škoda to Volkswagen. The investors perceived the country 
as a prospective production site for exports to the East. Moreover, Volkswagen’s 
acquisition of Škoda had a ‘herding effect’, drawing other investors into the re-
gion. The interest of foreign investors in taking part also in the privatisation of 
other companies that were actually privatised in the ‘Czech way’ is conﬁ rmed by 
various privatisation records [e.g. Myant 1999; McDermott 2002; Pavlínek 2002]. 
Box 1 illustrates the situation in the case of lorry manufacturers.
6 See, for instance, the interview with Dušan Tříska in Proﬁ t (a business weekly), 2 May 
2006, or Jiří Schwarz’s speech at the Czech-German colloquium ‘Reform and Transforma-
tion’ in Prague, 6 March 2001, later published as Schwarz [2003].
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It was thus the state strategy rather than the lack of interest among the in-
vestors that explained the relative absence of foreign investors in the restructur-
ing of Czech industry in the early 1990s. Crucial in this context was the victory 
of the neo-liberals in a path-shaping political struggle that culminated in June 
1992 [see Drahokoupil 2008: Chapter 3]. The neo-liberals mobilised enterprise 
managers, who feared losing their positions after a foreign takeover, to support 
voucher-oriented strategies in individual enterprises. More importantly, they 
marginalised the industrialists in a political struggle within the state by playing 
on anti-communist sentiment [see Gould 2001; Appel 2004; Drahokoupil 2008]. 
Many of the investors were thus turned down, especially after Vrba and his team 
were pushed out of power. What is more, some of the investors pulled out from 
the privatisation negotiations, as Klaus and his team were not willing to allow 
the state a more active role in restructuring, which would have guaranteed the 
contract commitments sought by the investors [McDermott 2002].
Czech strategy reﬂ ected the concerns of local neo-liberals. It prevented the 
earlier internationalisation of the commanding heights of the Czech economy and 
the emergence of foreign-led capitalism similar to the Hungarian model. Instead, 
Box 1. How Czech truck manufacturers were not sold to foreigners
Lorry production in Czechoslovakia was fragmented, with three major manufactur-
ers: Liaz, Tatra, and Avia. Vrba’s Ministry of Industry and Trade favoured a more in-
terventionist approach and reorganised the sector before privatisation. Yet, this statist 
strategy was difﬁ cult to pursue, as it met resistance from Klaus and his allies as well 
as from the management of the manufacturers themselves, which wanted to continue 
operating independently. In this context, the Ministry looked for buyers for the indi-
vidual manufacturers. On 9 March 1992, the Wall Street Journal reported on the process 
as follows: ‘Mercedes had to outbid France’s Renault S.A. and Iveco, a unit of Italy’s 
Fiat S.p.A., to snare two major truck companies in Czechoslovakia. A third Czechoslo-
vak truck producer, Tatra, is still being pursued by Western investors. “If we want to 
defend our European leadership, then we have to do something in Eastern Europe,” 
Mr Werner [of Mercedes’ management board] declares.’ Mercedes indeed signed let-
ters of intent to take stakes in two major truck companies, Avia and Liaz, in March 
1992. Liaz, however, turned down the deal with Mercedes, citing Mercedes’ intention 
to keep only part of the operation as the reason. Claiming to produce an excellent 
truck ideal for rough terrain, Tatra rejected a possible joint venture to assemble Iveco. 
Instead, it opted mainly for voucher privatisation, which guaranteed the management 
protection from state-led rationalisation across the sector or from a possible sale to a 
foreign ﬁ rm. Vrba linked the management’s decision to intervention from Tříska, one 
of Klaus’s close collaborators, who visited the factory to advise the management to 
adopt the voucher model in order to avoid their likely dismissal after Mercedes’ entry 
(interview by the author, 21 October 2005). Negotiations at Avia were accompanied 
by long delays, with Mercedes demanding protection from the domestic market. Mer-
cedes ﬁ nally pulled out in 1993 without giving any clear explanation as to why.
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the policies actually implemented produced a distinctive economic dynamic, 
Czech capitalism, and created a coalition of reform winners that provided politi-
cal support to the internally oriented project. At the same time, the neo-liberal 
strategy helped create conditions that offered structural advantages to foreign 
investors, which later, when the economic dynamics of Czech capitalism were 
exhausted, pushed the state strategy in the externally oriented direction. These 
structural conditions – which were largely in place throughout the 1990s – were 
translated into policy outcomes by the end of the decade.
Crisis-induced internationalisation: the policy turnaround 
in the Czech Republic
On 30 November 1997, Prime Minister Klaus handed in his government’s resigna-
tion in the wake of a political and economic crisis. The departure of Klaus and 
his government marked the dissolution of the Klausian project [see Myant 2003] 
and a profound reorientation of state strategy in relation to foreign investors. The 
economic programme of the caretaker government of Josef Tošovský, who was 
sworn in on 2 January 1998, included the aim of attracting foreign direct invest-
ment. In April 1998, the Tošovský government introduced a package of invest-
ment incentives with the aim of attracting foreign investment. This policy was 
then implemented by the Social Democrats, who took power in June 1998. The 
Social Democratic government would make attracting foreign investors a focal 
point of its economic strategy. It is often thought that the outward-oriented poli-
cies, FDI incentives in particular, came with the change of government, when the 
Klaus-led coalition moved into the opposition [e.g. Orenstein 2001: 93]. However, 
the historical record shows that the process of policy reorientation had much 
broader sources, which were largely independent of party politics. The political 
change may have ‘radicalised’ and catalysed the pace of the policy change, but 
it was not a decisive factor. As will be shown below, the policy U-turn has to be 
related to the structural power of transnational capital, as translated by its domes-
tic allies – the comprador service sector – and ampliﬁ ed by the exhaustion of the 
domestic accumulation strategy. 
It is often forgotten that it was already the Klaus government, and indeed 
Klaus himself, who made the decision to reconsider their hitherto negative ap-
proach to FDI promotion and provide subsidies to foreign investors in 1997. This 
contradicts the party-pluralist explanation. The history of the outward-oriented 
project, however, goes further back in time. It was already being developed within 
the state at the time when the Klausian inwardly oriented strategy was dominant. 
There was a group within the state that had been actively working on the promo-
tion of FDI. Located at the Department of Industry and Trade, these bureaucrats 
– a state fraction of the comprador service sector – faced a hostile environment. 
Nevertheless, they managed to thrive. In November 1992, they founded a for-
eign investment promotion agency: CzechInvest – at that time called the Czech 
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Agency for Foreign Investment. As recalled by Vladimír Dlouhý, then Minister of 
Industry and Trade, a Phare-ﬁ nanced Irish advisor had a crucial role in persuad-
ing Dlouhý of the utility and necessity of having such an agency.7 The EU’s ﬁ nan-
cial support was vital for the agency in the years that followed. The EU not only 
ﬁ nanced advisors that used Irish experience to make the case for the existence of 
an investment promotion agency, but also provided a crucial source of funding. 
Ireland was perceived as the ﬁ rst European tiger to emerge and transform its 
semi-peripheral location to make it an export-led ‘climber’ within the interna-
tional hierarchy [cf. Smith 2005]. Many within the EU apparatus and in the CEE 
states saw CEE as Ireland’s natural successor. The region was meant to replicate 
the ‘Celtic tiger’ experience within the EU. 
As Table 1 shows, external resources covered up to 62% of CzechInvest’s 
budget in the early 1990s. Moreover, some of the aid to CzechInvest was provided 
in kind and was not reﬂ ected in CzechInvest’s budget. Jan Havelka, CzechInvest’s 
founder and CEO in 1993–1999, very much underscores the importance of foreign 
aid for the organisation in the early 1990s. This is reﬂ ected in his estimate that 
around 80% of CzechInvest’s budget was paid for by foreign taxpayers in some 
years of the early 1990s. Havelka, who was recruited by foreign advisors because 
of his experience as a project manager at the Kuwait Investment Ofﬁ ce and as an 
advisor to the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, explains the importance of the 
EU in developing the foreign investment promotion agency in an environment 
that was very hostile to such activities:
7 Dlouhý’s contribution in CzechInvest [2002: 8–10].
Table 1. CzechInvest’s budget (in millions of Czech crowns)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
State funds 5.2 8.2 14.9 20.2 28.2 36.8 52.2 83.8 148.4 166.1
PHARE funds 2.1 13.4 22.3 30 22.9 21.7 21.5 50.9 0 0
Total 7.3 21.6 37.2 50.2 51.1 58.5 73.7 134.7 148.4 166.1
Spent on FDI 7.3 21.6 37.2 50.2 51.1 58.5 73.7 113.7 126.4 139.1
Spent on sourcing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.1 21.9 26
Total staff 14 18 24 28 32 31 35 44 54 63
State funds as % 
of total 71 38 40 40 55 63 71 62 100 100
Source: MIGA-FIAS (2005). It is important to note that some of the assistance received 
was free of charge and not reﬂ ected in the budget. The approximate annual exchange 
rates used are: 1 USD = 27 CZK (1993-1996); 1 USD = 33 CZK (1997); 1 USD = 30 CZK 
(1998); 1 USD = 34.64 CZK (1999); 1 USD = 38.59 CZK (2000);1 USD = 38.04 CZK (2001); 
1 USD = 33.3 CZK (2002). This table reﬂ ects some rounding of the decimal places. 
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[External support was indeed important.] I was supported by people from the World 
Bank and the European Commission. Thus, I was able to obtain massive funding 
from Phare in the early years. This gave me the image as someone who knew what 
he wanted in the eyes of [Minister of Industry and Trade] Dlouhý. I had the conﬁ -
dence of people who [the Minister] trusted. […] After I persuaded Dlouhý, I could 
afford such escapades as arranging – behind the back of the Ministry – permanent 
representations abroad, ﬁ nanced by Phare.8
Faced with a hostile environment both within the government and among 
the general public, Havelka’s strategy focused on changing the public’s percep-
tion of foreign investment and winning the government’s trust and gaining its 
support. In order to change the perception among state ofﬁ cials and to make al-
lies among them, CzechInvest used its Steering Committee, which included rep-
resentatives of other government institutions, the private sector, and banks, who 
were appointed by the Minister of Industry and Trade. CzechInvest employed 
internal public relations efforts to win over the understanding and trust of the 
government and especially the Ministry of Industry and Trade. For instance, 
CzechInvest invited government ofﬁ cials on study tours and remembered their 
birthdays and other personal events. To convince the public of the potential ben-
eﬁ ts of FDI, CzechInvest showcased the positive experiences of other countries 
and promoted the agency and its efforts through constant press releases. The 
agency needed to show quick results in order to demonstrate the positive im-
pact of FDI. ‘Greenﬁ eld’ projects were found suitable for these purposes. Thus, 
it focused on attracting greenﬁ eld manufacturing investments in the automotive, 
electronics, and precision engineering sectors. Such investment projects were re-
garded as having great potential to create good publicity through job creation, 
which also represented an important source of political capital that could be of-
fered to politicians. These projects also ﬁ tted with the common belief about the 
traditional strength of Czechs in the area of manufacturing, their technical skills, 
and the country’s trained labour force. 
In 1996, CzechInvest established the Association of Foreign Investors (AFI) 
to serve as an ofﬁ cial body representing the interests of investors to the gov-
ernment and to link local service providers with foreign investors. Apart from 
its business function, AFI proved to be an important vehicle for soliciting and 
channelling investors’ concerns to the government, and it helped CzechInvest 
to ﬁ nance activities aimed at promoting investment-friendly policies within the 
government. AFI funds represented 5–10% of CzechInvest’s total funding. AFI’s 
activities were aimed at building a ‘working relationship’ between investors and 
the government. They include breakfast meetings, unofﬁ cial meetings with min-
isters, unofﬁ cial contacts with investors, and the AFI/CzechInvest-sponsored an-
nual awards such as Best Investor, Most Successful Industrial Zone, and Most 
Successful Supplier. AFI and CzechInvest also initiated working groups on a 
8 Interview with Jan Havelka, Prague, 30 December 2005.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2009, Vol. 45, No. 3
562
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 T
im
el
in
e
 
 
G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 
(%
)
G
FC
F 
gr
ow
th
 
(%
)*
Bu
dg
et
 
ba
la
nc
e 
(C
Z
K
 
bn
)
C
ur
re
nt
 
ac
co
un
t 
/ 
G
D
P 
(%
)
Tr
ad
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
(C
Z
K
 
bn
)*
*
Ex
ch
an
ge
 
ra
te
 U
SD
 
(e
nd
 o
f 
pe
ri
od
)
K
ey
 e
ve
nt
s/
po
lic
y 
m
ea
su
re
s
19
95
 
5.
8
19
.8
**
*
7.
2
–2
.5
–6
3.
1*
**
*
26
.6
 
19
96
 
4.
1
9.
9
–1
.6
–6
.6
–1
19
.4
27
.3
3
A
 s
tr
in
g 
of
 b
an
k 
fa
ilu
re
s;
 A
FI
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d;
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
C
en
tr
al
 
ba
nk
 w
id
en
s 
cu
rr
en
cy
 ﬂ 
uc
tu
at
io
n 
ba
nd
; J
un
e 
C
B 
ti
gh
te
ns
 
m
on
et
ar
y 
re
st
ra
in
t
19
97
Q
1
1.
0
0.
6
–3
0.
3
29
.2
A
pr
il
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t r
es
po
nd
s 
to
 g
ro
w
in
g 
bu
dg
et
 d
eﬁ
 c
it
 
w
it
h 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
cu
ts
 (‘
Pa
ck
ag
e 
I’
); 
M
ay
 C
en
tr
al
 b
an
k 
al
lo
w
s 
cu
rr
en
cy
 to
 ﬂ 
oa
t; 
C
ur
re
nc
y 
sp
ec
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
IM
F 
cr
it
ic
is
m
 le
ad
s 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t t
o 
fu
rt
he
r 
bu
dg
et
 c
ut
s 
(‘P
ac
ka
ge
 II
’);
 S
tr
ai
ns
 in
 c
oa
lit
io
n 
in
te
ns
if
y 
(p
ar
ty
–ﬁ
 n
an
c-
in
g 
sc
an
da
ls
); 
K
ey
 m
in
is
te
rs
 r
ep
la
ce
d;
 A
ug
us
t G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
of
fe
rs
 s
ub
si
di
es
 to
 In
te
l; 
N
ov
em
be
r 
G
M
 o
ffe
re
d 
su
bs
id
ie
s;
 
M
r 
K
la
us
 r
es
ig
ns
Q
2
–0
.4
–7
.7
–2
7.
4
32
.0
5
Q
3
–1
.6
–1
0.
9
–2
0.
9
32
.7
9
Q
4
–1
.9
–4
.6
–1
4.
2
34
.6
4
 
 
–0
.7
–5
.7
–1
5.
7
–6
.2
–9
2.
8
34
.6
4
19
98
Q
1
–1
.7
–6
.6
–1
3.
0
33
.6
8
Ja
nu
ar
y 
In
te
ri
m
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t f
or
m
ed
 u
nd
er
 M
r 
To
šo
vs
ký
; 
A
pr
il
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
pp
ro
ve
s 
in
ve
st
m
en
t s
up
po
rt
 s
ch
em
e 
co
m
-
m
is
si
on
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
K
la
us
 g
ov
er
ne
m
en
t i
n 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
 ‘p
ac
ka
ge
s’
; 
Ju
ly
 M
in
or
it
y 
So
ci
al
 D
em
oc
ra
t g
ov
er
nm
en
t f
or
m
ed
Q
2
–1
.1
4.
2
–2
0.
9
33
.4
2
Q
3
–0
.3
2.
7
–2
5.
0
29
.9
4
Q
4
0.
0
–3
.0
–2
3.
7
29
.8
6
 
 
–0
.8
–0
.9
–2
9.
3
–2
.0
–8
2.
7
29
.8
6
19
99
 
1.
3
–3
.3
–2
9.
6
–2
.4
–1
9.
7
35
.9
8
 
So
ur
ce
: C
ze
ch
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 O
fﬁ
 c
e 
(s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
, a
ut
ho
r’
s 
co
m
pi
la
ti
on
 (e
ve
nt
s)
.
* 
G
ro
ss
 ﬁ 
xe
d 
ca
pi
ta
l f
or
m
at
io
n
**
 C
on
st
an
t p
ri
ce
s 
of
 2
00
0
**
* 
So
ur
ce
: O
EC
D
 E
co
no
m
ic
 O
ut
lo
ok
, D
ec
em
be
r 
20
01
 
**
**
 C
ur
re
nt
 p
ri
ce
s
Jan Drahokoupil: Internationalisation of the State in the Czech Republic
563
number of issues, including labour law, tax accounting, residency issues, and 
real estate development.
However, these attempts to set the agenda and create channels of represen-
tation to exercise agency-power had only limited success throughout the mid-
1990s. The government was refusing to provide preferential treatment to foreign 
investors, as promoted by CzechInvest. This had some apparent consequences 
as far as investors’ locational decisions were concerned. Petr Hájek, working at 
CzechInvest at that time, illustrates this with the example of a situation where a 
Japanese corporation asked for an import duty waiver on machinery it was going 
to import for its production plant. Klaus rejected the deal and the investor went to 
another country where it was able to receive such concessions. The turning point 
came in 1997 when Intel and General Motors (GM) were looking for investment 
sites in Europe and explored possibilities in the Czech Republic. According to 
Havelka, Klaus became interested as he favoured American investors. CzechIn-
vest used their familiar line that the Czech Republic was not competitive without 
investment subsidies, which were provided by direct competitors, most notably 
Hungary. In contrast, Klaus believed in the country’s natural comparative advan-
tages. Yet, the negotiations with Intel and GM demonstrated the importance of 
‘non-natural’ factors.
The combination of these hard lessons, a mounting economic crisis, and the 
fact that the Czech Republic was a regional laggard in terms of FDI inﬂ ows made 
the Klaus government reconsider its approach to foreign investors (see the time-
line in Table 2). When the limits of internally oriented accumulation – the ‘Czech 
way’ – became apparent, the only alternative seemed to be the externally oriented 
approach. The agenda-setting activities of the comprador service sector not only 
helped to construct such an understanding, but also offered an easy policy so-
lution at a time of crisis: investment incentives. Under these circumstances, the 
sector could capitalise on their connection/link to foreign investors and translate 
their structural power into political capital, giving the comprador service sec-
tor a privileged position in Czech policy making. This lent the agenda-setting 
activities and channels of representation the sector had organised considerable 
potential for political inﬂ uence.
The year 1997 saw a drop in private investment, which derailed the bal-
anced-budget policy. Rising consumer demand started to inﬂ ate labour costs and 
stimulated imports. The current account swung into deﬁ cit [see Myant 2003]. In 
April 1997, the government reacted to the growing budget deﬁ cit, the pressure 
on the currency, and IMF criticism with an emergency ‘package’ of budget cuts. 
With key economic ministers resigning from the government, currency specu-
lation led to another ‘package’ of emergency measures in May 1997. In August 
1997, the government offered Intel a package of subsidies, as it had demanded. 
In November 1997, just a few days before its resignation, it offered a similar pack-
age to GM. As a part of the ‘little packages’ released in response to the economic 
crisis, Klaus assigned the Minister of Industry and Trade with the task of drafting 
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an investment-incentives scheme. However, political developments did not allow 
Klaus’s team to vote on the proposal from the Ministry. Thus, it was the Tošovský 
government that approved the investment support scheme in April 1998.
Witnessing the many failures of domestic enterprises privatised with the 
voucher method or in the ‘Czech way’, most Czech economists began to per-
ceive foreign capital as a major opportunity to stimulate economic development. 
Moreover, by the mid-1990s, various ‘economic experts’, mostly young econo-
mists working at investment banks or ﬁ nance consulting companies, established 
prominence in media discourse. They not only emphasised the need to attract 
foreign capital, but also called for the introduction of investment subsidies. At the 
same time, CzechInvest’s PR efforts proved to be successful, and CzechInvest’s 
experts often commented publicly on FDI-relevant issues and emphasised the 
need for an investment support scheme.9 Thus, when the decision to introduce 
an investment support scheme was reported in the media, it was accompanied by 
praise from established commentators.10
Investment incentives, however, became a political issue, structured along 
party lines, with ODS being critical of the scheme and the Social Democrats 
(ČSSD) embracing investment support. This gave rise to the impression that in-
vestment support actually came with the new government. The leader of ODS’s 
MPs, Vlastimil Tlustý, expressed strong disagreement with the investment scheme 
proposed by the Tošovský government, despite the fact that the caretaker gov-
ernment presented the policy as a continuation of measures included in Klaus’s 
‘small packages’ of reforms. In contrast, the leader of the Social Democrats, Miloš 
Zeman, welcomed the decision of the provisional government, stating that it in 
a way draws on the programme of the Social Democratic Party. He claimed that 
the Social Democratic Party would continue to develop its policy if they won the 
elections.11 The project to attract FDI, and the investment incentives in particular, 
came to be perceived as a Social Democratic project. The opposition ODS would 
very much use this interpretative framework in its attacks on the Social Demo-
crats and their policies. ČSSD would reinforce this interpretation to demonstrate 
the successes of its economic policy. 
By 1997, there was indeed an implicit consensus within the Social Dem-
ocratic Party about the desirability of foreign investment support. A group of 
economists around former Minister of Industry and Trade, Jan Vrba, which in-
cluded Jan Mládek, Pavel Mertlík, and Jiří Havel, represented the main propo-
nents of such a strategy. They were assigned to develop industrial policy for the 
party. However, in the time leading up to the elections, there were also quite vo-
cal nationalistic statements, making references, for instance, to the ‘family silver,’ 
9 E.g. ‘Chybí investiční pobídky, tvrdí analytici’ (Analysts: Investment Incentives Are 
Lacking), Lidové noviny, 1 October 1997. 
10 E.g. ‘Vláda dala najevo, že stojí o cizí capital’ (The Government Made Clear It Is Inter-
ested in Foreign Capital), Mladá fronta Dnes, 30 April 1998.
11 ‘Kabinet výrazně podpořil cizí i domácí investory’ (Cabinet Strongly Supported Foreign 
Investors), Proﬁ t, 4 May 1998. 
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coming from parts of the ranks of the Social Democrats. It was understood that 
Miroslav Grégr, former manager of the state-owned enterprise Desta and a major 
adversary of Vrba within ČSSD, was the main proponent of economic national-
ism in ČSSD.12 Havelka recalls a situation where he was attacked by Grégr at a 
parliamentary committee for bringing competitors into good Czech enterprises. 
Grégr himself claims that he was in favour of creating Czech capital in the early 
1990s. He believed that ‘national capitalism’ with limited FDI inﬂ ow would be 
viable if enterprises were restructured by the state before being privatised. 
After the elections in July 1998, the Social Democrats came to power. They 
made foreign investment support, including the investment-incentives scheme, 
the ﬂ agship of their economic and industrial policy. This included not only 
supporting the incentives scheme, but also relying on foreign investors in the 
remaining privatisation cases. The Social Democrats would use the successful 
cases of privatisation to foreigners, such as Škoda-Volkswagen, as examples that 
such a strategy works. Moreover, they could already use the ﬁ rst wave of inves-
tors who were granted investment incentives. The scheme of investment support 
was met with great interest from investors. Only one month after it was intro-
duced, CzechInvest reported there had been 111 applicants. Zeman, as the new 
prime minister, took part in the opening ceremony of the Matsushita plant, which 
marked the success of the project to attract investment. For investors, this was a 
sign of the new government’s strong commitment to the investment-incentives 
scheme. For CzechInvest, which was put in a position of uncertainty after Grégr 
became the Minister of Industry and Trade, it became clear that it would ﬁ nd 
strong political support within the government. Indeed, Grégr jumped on the 
bandwagon of foreign investment support. 
After the elections in 2006, ODS formed the government. One of the most 
vocal critics of the investment incentives scheme, Martin Říman (ODS), became 
the Minister of Industry and Trade. Based on the bold statements of ODS politi-
cians in the Opposition, there were many reasons to expect a scaling down of the 
investment schemes. Shortly after Říman took the post, he introduced an amend-
ment to the law on investment incentives, which he presented as a major change 
in approach.13 In fact, rather than changing the state strategy, this amendment 
included retargeting investment support to more technology-intensive activities, 
as had actually been planned by the ministry and CzechInvest before Říman and 
ODS took power. Thus, ODS was implementing an adjustment to the incentives 
that would have been made anyway. Therefore, the Social Democrats had no ob-
jections to supporting the amendment in Parliament.14
12 It must be noted, however, that Grégr participated in the privatisation of Škoda to 
Volkswagen, which he later very much boasted about.
13 See ‘Říman vyhlásil stop montovnám’ (Říman: Stop Assembly Plants) iHNed.cz, 19 Oc-
tober 2006.
14 See also J. Drahokoupil, ‘Is CzechInvest Facing Extinction?’ Czech Business Weekly, 7 May 
2007, http:/www.cbw.cz/phprs/2007050702.html.
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Conclusion: political support for the competition state
The reorientation of Czech industrial policy underscores the importance of struc-
tural pressures in steering state strategies in the direction of competition. Nego-
tiations with investors proved to be key mechanisms for translating the structural 
power of transnational capital into policy outcomes. At the same time, the project 
of the competition state was promoted within the state by a group of state manag-
ers, the state fraction of the comprador service sector. It organised a coalition of 
forces promoting the competition state. Mediated by the activities of this group, 
the structural power of capital brought the comprador service sector into a prom-
inent position in domestic politics. The EU provided important support to the 
activities of the comprador service sector in the early 1990s. Later, EU regulation 
effectively precluded attempts to promote national capitalism. The Czech story 
shows that the actual support for the competition state cuts across party lines, the 
political rhetoric notwithstanding. 
Externally oriented strategies became predominant all across the V4 by 1999. 
They have been pursued by governments regardless of the ruling party coalitions 
[cf. Bohle 2006]. Political support for the competition state goes beyond narrow 
short-term interests and immediate material concessions, as was largely the case 
with the national projects of the early 1990s [Drahokoupil 2008: Chapters 3 and 4]. 
The wide embracement of the competition state has to be related to the structural 
environment, which produces a ﬁ eld of force that not only puts constraints on 
possible strategies, but also makes the externally oriented strategy a ‘comprehen-
sive programme’ for societies in the region. These structural features also include 
dominant interpretative/ideational frames. In this context, the ‘business school 
notion of globalisation’ – including the assumption of perfect capital mobility 
and capital’s insistence on pursuing neo-liberal policies – that is popular among 
policy makers is particularly important. The structural ﬁ eld of force shapes the 
‘ﬁ eld of the politically thinkable’ [Bourdieu 1984] and thus makes the externally 
oriented project not only a positive programme, but also a framework of thinking 
that facilitates the articulation of various ideological positions, including resist-
ance, on its own terms. The intellectuals of the competition state can thus defend 
investment subsidies even from ‘a market perspective’, according to which the 
policy, rather than being a market intervention, actually reﬂ ects relations in the 
global market for investment and in particular the excess of demand for FDI over 
its supply. 
The structural power of multinational capital was crucial for reorienting 
state strategy in the Czech Republic. However, contrary to the state-centric un-
derstanding of state-multinational bargaining [Vernon 1998; Eden, Lemway and 
Schuler 2005; Meyer and Jensen 2005], implementation of the competition-state 
project cannot be understood just as the outcome of the unequal distribution of 
power between foreign investors and governments. As mentioned above, govern-
ments are not social actors independent of other social forces, such as investors 
and their allies. As the actual policy outcomes are a product of the agency of 
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particular social forces mediated through structures of representation centred on 
and within the state, it is the privileged position of social forces connected to FDI, 
the comprador service sector in particular, within respective states and societies 
that explains the support for the competition agenda. 
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